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"e articles collected in this volume are based upon a =rm intellectual assump-
tion postulating that the cognitive categories of sense, common-sense and non-
sense are also cultural constructs being perpetuated and (re)produced in numer-
ous artworks. From this perspective, the publication aims to create a forum of aca-
demic dialogue engaging the heteroglossia of multidisciplinary and trans-cultural 
voices whose intellectual modus operandi is the quest for unravelling the herme-
neutic dilemmas implicit in the languages of (non)sense and disguised as philo-
sophical, literary and artistic insights into the nature of cultural meaningfulness in 
the textual as well as scopic “regimes” of symbolic reality.  
Philosophy and the Absurd
In traditional philosophical inquiries, just to mention Kierkegaard’s and Ca-
mus’ formative insights into the matter, the category of the absurd arises out of 
the fundamental and ontological disharmony experienced between an individu-
al’s search for the elusive meaning and the apparent meaninglessness of the uni-
verse. Yet nowadays, scholarly perception and the philosophical interpretation of 
the absurd seems, as Guliana di Biase claims, to have changed: it is no more the 
adequacy of the world in satisfying our deepest needs which is put in question, but 
it is these needs themselves that should adapt to a new, individualistic way of con-
ceiving life. "e feeling of absurd in our contemporary societies is assimilated to an 
individual disease: so, in the end, it seems that the individual himself is the prob-
lem, not the opacity of the world in which he lives. Hence, in a purely Durkheimian 
mode of analysis, Di Biase claims that an individualistic society increases the sub-
jective perception of the absurd, while a society motivated by solidarity does the 
opposite. Since the world can answer to man’s demand of meaning only with the 
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Anna Kérchy 
(Un)making Sense of Nonsense in Lewis Carroll’s Alice Tales 
My paper proposes to trace some characteristics of the interpretive process making sense of nonsense through a 
case-study of Lewis Carroll’s Victorian literary nonsense fantasies narrating Alice’s adventures in Wonderland 
and through the looking glass, initially written for children, yet challenging and epitomizing the (im)possibilities 
of ‘adult’ meaning (de)formations ever since.1 
My working definition for nonsense shall be any discursive claim, written text or act of symbolisation that 
resembles, and is decoded as language, as meaningful communication, yet its intelligibility becomes dubious, 
defamiliarised along with our conventional representational and interpretive strategies meant to make sense of it. 
Nonsense requires recipients, along with the fictionally implied reader Alice, to exercise an inventive linguistic 
creativity, to make self-corrections, re-readings and playful deconstructions, while exchanging primary (normal, 
literal, denotative) meanings for supplementary (less obvious, figurative, poetic) ones or vice versa, succeeding 
to Humpty Dumptian claims of ‘that’s not what I meant’2. Nonsense can result of the confusion of literal and 
metaphorical meanings. Over-literalisations of idiomatic expressions and figures of speech produce fantastically 
absurd phenomena characteristic of children’s literature, such as mad hatters, grinning cats, or crocodile tears, 
but the “hyperlogic”3 leading to dialogues like “’I beg your pardon?’ ‘It isn’t respectable to beg.’”4 also belong 
to the same category. In nonsense literally lived experience gains a symbolical, metaphorical value, like when 
the little girl’s dreaded coming-of-age is fictionalised via Alice’s metamorphic growing and shrinking. Nonsense 
gives up sense for the sake of focusing on sound: “any word can be arbitrarily defined at whim”5 purely on the 
basis of its auditory feel, turning homophones, homonyms, and even antonyms into synonyms  (eg. boughs bark 
saying boughwough, the tortoise taught us, and hills are valleys). Similarily, nonsensical sound sequences, 
referentless signifiers provoke an unlimited proliferation of sense (like toves, described as “something like 
badgers,” “something like lizards” and “something like corkscrews” likely evoke different mental images in each 
reader6). Nonsense springs from semantic and syntactic impossibilities. Half-familiar neologisms turn language 
topsy-turvy, like in the case of the numerous portmanteaus with fake etymologies in the poem Jabberwocky7. 
Tautologies, naturalised category mistakes, “semantically opaque categories”8 and logical twists make us wonder 
whether one can have less or more than no tea at all, whether getting back one’s own thimble is really a prize, if 
seeing Nobody on the road is a proof of good eyesight, or how mock turtle-soup tastes like.  
I wish to suggest that the engulfment of any narrative by such nonsense phenomena leads to metalinguistic, 
metanarrative insights concerning the very (mal)functioning of our sense-making methods. A particular stress is 
put on the rhetorical function of verbal interactions, which necessarily foreground the inherent metaphorical, 
visual and vocal quality of language, contributing to the proliferation of poetical, figurative, connotative 
meanings. Jean-Jacques Lecercle praises as the ultimate feat of nonsense its eliciting a self-reflective awareness 
of the very ambiguity of common-sense, a pleasurable intellectual excitement resulting from the metatextual 
recognition of the misbehaviour of language, whereby our focus shifts from the what on the how of meaning-
construction.9 Among the most fascinating scholarly takes on the Alice-books, rhetorical readings tackle how 
Carrollian wordplay discloses the poetic-metaphorical surplus, the political-ideological charge or the socio-
cultural-historical residue of ‘ordinary’, everyday language. Revealing the associative, allusive and imaginative 
quality of discursive elements and their particular combinations or (sub)versions adds a metadiscursive level to 
communication.  
‘Meta-concerns’ involved include serious language philosophical issues approaching poststructuralist dilemmas 
on pantextuality and unspeakability, oververbalization and understatement. Nonsense makes us aware of the 
paradoxical tension between the simultaneous necessity of misinterpretations and the impossibility of 
meaninglessness. On the one hand, miscomprehensions are inevitable due to the insufficiency of our communal 
sign system to unambiguously represent or communicate unmediated our subjective experience of ‘the reality,’ 
that we are doomed to lose direct contact with through our socialization, and the succeeding symbolization, 
verbalization. On the other hand, our being ‘always-already’ grounded in meaning prevents nonsense from ever 
 
1 Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Alice. The Definitive Edition, ed. Martin Gardner (London: Penguin, 2001)  
2 Carroll, Annotated Alice, pp. 221 and 224. 
3 Leila S. May, “Wittgenstein’s Reflection in Lewis Carroll’s Looking Glass,” Philosophy and Literature, vol. 31 (2007), p. 
83. 
4 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 235. 
5 May, “Wittgenstein’s,” p. 84. 
6 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 226. 
7 Carroll, Annotated Alice, pp. 155 and 225. 
8 Fiona MacArthur, “Embodied Figures of Speech: Problem Solving in Alice’s Dream of Wonderland,” Atlantis, vol. 26. no. 
2 (Dec 2004), p. 51. 
9  Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense. The Intuitions of Victorian Nonsense Literature (New York: Routledge, 
1994) 
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being meaningless, due to the human senses’ and mind’s psychic compulsion and evolutionary necessity to trace, 
memorize and recognize patterns, and to make sense even out of apparent senselessness, a cognitive automatism 
described by Gestalt psychology. A further tension of signification enacted by nonsense resides between the 
interpretive communities’ consensual meanings and the subjectively intvended, individually deviated, private 
meanings.  
In a proto-post-modernist vein, the logician Carroll’s rationally based delusional nonsense reveals alternative 
ways of relating to reality. He goes as far as to circumscribe an epistemology of uncertainty, of unknowing by 
virtue of doubting the transparency of language and questioning the user’s mastery over it. Nonsense, by 
anatomizing our very language-use, also sheds light on the fictionalized nature of the narratively constructed 
self-identity and the inherent splitting of the “speaking subject-spoken subject-subject in speech” triad10. This 
idea is encapsulated perhaps best by the initial scene when Alice falling down the rabbit hole enters into a 
fantasy world, and also falls into the text to become a fictional character, a dream child forever small, innocent, 
curious and cherished in Carroll’s imagination. Nonsense highlights the shifts and gaps between reality, reality’s 
experience, experience’s cognition that may or may not occur, (mis)representations of the experience of reality, 
and (mis)interpretations of the (mis)representations. Humpty Dumpty’s claim “When I use a word it means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”11 can be easily related to Wittgenstein’s “private language 
argument.”12 It stages both the liberating and the imprisoning nature of the inherent polysemy of discourse, 
highlighting that the very same conventional sign system prevents us from getting our message exactly through 
and allows us grounds for playful representation(al reimaginings of our realities). In language games we do not 
play against each other, but against the game itself, as the rules keep reorganising themselves and each other. 
When Lecercle’s historical analysis draws parallels between the emergence of rebellious nonsense and of the 
newly introduced, highly restrictive Victorian public school system that the ultimately non-moralizing text might 
be meant to parody or compensate for13, he shows that the arbitrarily rule-bound, ideologically infiltrated, 
socially binding side of discourse is just as much a motivation for nonsense as the ludic-transgressive potential of 
language. The limiting nature of language and the necessity of misrepresentation and misinterpretation are 
illustrated by the scene where the White King tries to write a memorandum but his words are distorted and end 
up saying something completely different than intended. It is an outside force, Alice, the reader who leads his 
pencil that writes “all manner of things that he doesn’t intend;” therefore the words he writes are never purely 
his.14  
The limits of language-use coincide with the limitlessness of meanings. As Carroll writes in a letter commenting 
on his nonsensical The Hunting of the Snark15 to the Lowrie children, “words mean more than we mean to 
express when we use them, so a whole book ought to mean a great deal more than the writer meant.”16 Literary 
nonsense, far from fearing miscommunication celebrates the playfulness of polysemy. It invites to the realization 
of Roland Barthes’ pleasure-text where co-authoring individual readers weave meanings into the original 
texture.17 (Thus, they enact the very etymology of the word text(ere), that means to weave).  
Besides its meta-linguistic, rhetoricising tendencies, nonsense elicits the trans-verbal, embodied experience of 
language-use. It brings into play the enworlded speaking subject’s bodily frame resonating discourse, the 
material surplus-meanings of incarnated voice (individual prosody, intonation, pitch, melody, or speech 
impediment as evocative of mood, personality, emotion, experience, etc., and thus carrier of significance), as 
well as corporeally lived sounds (the musicality of speech, the materiality of signifiers, the shape and sound of 
letters). These precede/surpass and complement sense, while contributing to the somatisation of semiosis18, to 
foregrounding the corporeal, physical nature of the signifying activity. Rhetorical readings reveal how the 
linguistic subversion of nonsensical text culminates in the embodied lived experience of the blissfully rhyming, 
rhythmic, repetitive, “revolutionary poetic language-use” described by Julia Kristeva as a liminal discursive 
mode putting “subject and meaning in process/on trial.”19 The symbolically repressed primary drives, desires and 
bodily energies (re)surface to plug language-users back to the pre-verbal, semiotic, corporeally-marked realms 
through the musical-material means of sounds, rhythm and letters, logico-linguistic twists, and infinite liberties 
 
10 Julia Kristeva, “The Speaking Subject,” in On Signs, ed. Marshall Blonsky (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985), pp. 210-
220.  
11 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 224. 
12 Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §243. 
13 Lecercle, Philosophy, p. 4. 
14 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 154. 
15 Lewis Carroll, “The Hunting of the Snark,” Literature.org, ‹http://www.literature.org/authors/carroll-lewis/the-hunting-of-
the-snark/› 
16 quoted in Jan Susina, “’Why is a Raven like a Writing-Desk?’: The Play of Letters in Lewis Carroll's Alice 
Books,”Children's Literature Association Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1 (2001), p. 17. 
17 Roland Barthes, “The Pleasure of the Text,” in The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1975), pp. 3-67. 
18 Peter Brooks, Body Work. Objects of Desire in Modern Narrative (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993) 
19 Julia Kristeva, “Le sujet en procès,” Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, 1977), pp. 55-106.  
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of private languages20. Unlike in the Wonderland Duchess’s claim21, it is the sound that comes first and not the 
sense. In Carrollian wonderlands we joyously feed on the embodied voice, like little girls in the treacle well, 
where for being well one can only draw manner of things beginning with an “m,” such as mouse-traps, the 
moon, memories and muchness.22 
Beyond common-sense, the knowledgeable feeling of nonsense implies a total experience fusing – without 
necessarily reconciling – intellectual, emotional and physical stimulations of a language moved by lack and 
excess alike. The fleshly performative, emotionally invested, trans-verbally embodied sur-charge of 
signification, the mise-en-scène of the incarnated voice resonating the revolutionary poetic language and the 
corporeal sensations excited in recipients enhance the affective/sensual, in that sense ‘trans-sensical’ nature of 
meaning formation. 
However, Carroll’s images and puns may also be convincingly associated with metaphorics of post-structuralist 
theories of subjectivity. Readers are literally made to fracture the looking-glass as the disruption of sense returns 
them to the limes-state of the Lacanian “mirror-stage” marking their entry into the socially disciplined realm of 
symbolization23. They blissfully get lost in language, while they stumble down the rabbit hole with Alice whose 
shrinking-growing body constantly “disseminates” just like the Derridean or De Manian “self-deconstructing 
meaning” doomed to decompose and reorganize itself with each use and each new context24.  
Elaborating on the metatextual component, when it comes to readers of Carrollian nonsense, Hugh Haughton 
inventively differentiates between the two kinds of approaches. On the one hand there are Gryphons who simply 
wish to enjoy a children’s story without making any efforts at serious interpretations, and who claim that 
adventures should come first since explanations are such a waste of time. On the other hand, Queens insist that 
even jokes should have meanings, that one should make an attempt to make sense, especially when it comes to 
children and adults’ responsibility for them, and stress that Carroll’s nonsense is made expressive precisely by its 
meaningfulness25. These interpretive stances – which can be adopted generalised throughout the reception of any 
nonsense fantasy work (especially the ones written and read for children) – put forward fascinating theoretical 
dilemmas. They concern the (im)possibility of a perception without interpretation or even cognition, of a 
joyously forgetful yet revelatory revelry in sustained meaninglessness – matching the transverbal embodied 
aspect of signification, modelled by the Gryphons’s stance. But they also relate to the (im)possibility of a fully 
rational, neutral, and objective meaning-fixation that would lack any emotional surcharge or affective side-effect 
usually resulting from psychic involvement in or corporeal reactions to the reading experience – illustrated by 
the Queens’s stance enacting the metalinguistic, self-referential aspect of signification.  
Nevertheless, elaborating on Jean-Jacques LeCercle’s thought-provoking ideas on the attraction nonsense 
literature holds for the “logophiliac fou littéraire”26 – a type of reader obsessed with a slow close-reading – I 
wish to suggest that any critical (ie. academic) reading attempting a serious take on the Alice books combines 
features of the Gryphon’s and the Queen’s interpretive methods as complementaries. This reader – likely 
resembling most of the readers of my study – could be compared to another Carrollian character, Humpty 
Dumpty. Throughout our interpretations we do take ourselves seriously, often elaborating whole philosophical 
backups for our analyses, yet we tend to ‘cheat’ a bit, “to hold the book upside down”27 as the eggman does, to 
slightly reformulate the text’s plot structure, its sound patterns, or cause-effect or character relations in order to 
make them precisely meet our expectations, to fit our hypotheses concerning textual meanings, as we try to tame 
the text’s heterogeneity within a coherent reading.28 The logophiliac critical reader, like Humpty Dumpty “makes 
words mean” “just what [one] choose[s] them to mean – neither more, nor less.”29 However, highly 
 
20 Julia Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique (Paris: Seuil, 1985), pp. 11-100. 
21 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 96. 
22 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 80. 
23 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in 
Modern Literary Theory. A reader, eds. Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Edward Arnold, 
1992), pp. 8-15. 
24 eg. Paul De Man, “Autobiography as De-Facement,” Modern Language Notes, vol. 94. no. 5 (1979 Dec), pp. 919-930. 
Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 
25 Hugh Haughton, “Introduction,” The Centenary Edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-
Glass and What Alice Found There (London: Penguin, 1998), p. xi. The two passages Haughton  refers to are: “‘No, no! The 
adventures first,’ said the Gryphon in an impatient tone: ‘explanations take such a dreadful time.’” [...] “but the Red Queen 
interrupted her impatiently. ’That’s just what I complain of! You should have meant! What do you suppose is the use of a 
child without any meaning? Even a joke should have some meaning – and a child’s more important than a joke, I hope.’’ in: 
Carroll, Annotated Alice, pp. 109 and 265. 
26 Lecercle, Philosophy, p. 3. 
27 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 223. 
28 While Lecercle gives a single specific example for the logophiliac overinterpretation of the Carrollian text decoded as a 
reformulation of the Talmud, I would argue that to a certain extant all our critical readings bear characteristics of folie 
littéraire. (Lecercle, Philosophy, pp. 5-20.) 
29 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 224. 
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ambiguously, this chosen meaning supported by the interpretation often seems to end up oscillating between 
being either more (Queen’s overinterpretation) or less (Gryphon’s nonsense) than the supposed authorially 
intended arch-meaning that remains by definition unresolvable.  
Accordingly, Alice’s question, “whether you can make words mean so many different things”30 does not so 
much concern the possibility of (the all too obvious) textual polyphony and interpretive diversity, but more likely 
makes a metatextual commentary on the ideal reader’s ability or willingness to enter into play with the text’s 
ambiguous ways of (un)making sense. It concerns the reader’s capacity to cooperate in the various language-
games literally enacted in the grotesque moves and incomprehensible choreographies accompanying or 
substituting most of the interpersonal communicative interactions Alice is summoned to join during her 
wanderings. (These are the Lobster Quadrille with the Gryphon and the Mock Turtle, the backward running with 
the Red Queen, the tangled twists and turns of the Caucus Race with birds and mice, or the contrariwise dancing 
around with Tweedledee and Tweedledum.)  
The question how compulsive over-interpretation (ie. production of hypermeaning) and the bliss resulting from 
the textual blindspots’ undecipherability (ie. activation of nonsense) relate to each other throughout the reading 
process is particularly interesting if we return to the question of the (im)possibility of a perception without 
cognition, and a cognition without interpretation, of looking without seeing, of hearing/reading without being 
able or willing to comprehend. In the Alice books we find perfect examples for typical readerly reactions to 
nonsense: on first reading the mirror-poem Jabberwocky, perhaps the most famous example of nonsense verse 
ever, Alice reacts in the following way: “’It seems very pretty,’ she said when she had finished it, ‘but it’s rather 
hard to understand!’ (You see she didn’t like to confess, ever to herself, that she couldn’t make it out at all.) 
‘Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas – only I don’t exactly know what they are!’”31  
This uncertainty concerning the priority of aesthetic pleasure or rational comprehension in their relation to 
‘understanding’, and the interpreter’s confusion felt upon facing meaninglessness and unknowing is connected to 
a curious differentiation made between the oral and the written. In another episode, Alice pondering – on the 
nonsensical moralising of the Duchess of the type “There’s a large mustard-mine near here. And the moral of 
that is – The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.”32 – says: “I think I should understand that better, if 
I had it written down: but I can’t quite follow it as you say it.”33 While the written, readable text’s analysis holds 
the potential for cognition, even metalinguistic recognitions described above, illuminating meanings and the 
significance of meaningless, on the contrary, orality, mere uttering or hearing remains the subject and source of 
miscomprehension, polysemy or ambiguity. The challenge of phonocentricism by logocentrism, the written text 
as storehouse of meaning versus the faulty, fallible voice leads us to the other aspect of the production and 
reception of nonsense literature that can be related to the material experience of the voice, sound patterns, 
transverbal rhythms, repetitions, musicality permeating discourse.  
Although poststructuralist literary criticism has associated vocality with embodied experience and revolutionary 
poetic language’s capacity to subvert conventional representation through corporeal pleasures of the very 
sounds’s ‘feel’ invading signification, biographically speaking the voice was a constant source of anxiety for the 
incurably stammering Lewis Carroll. His speech impediment referred to as a hesitation made him stumble upon 
words, choke on sounds, especially initial sounds, especially on reading out texts. Conforming to the myth, he 
not only refused to be ordained a priest on accounts of being unable to preach sermons, but he also had 
considerable inhibitions in average communicative interaction, making him shy, reserved, austere, and lonely 
with one single exception. His speech defect is said to have miraculously ceased whenever he entered the 
company of his child friends for whom he invented the tales that made him legendary.34  
Signification’s transverbal, vocal-material component, especially the incorrectly uttered sound, or the faultily 
spelt word complement the primary sense with a surcharge of sensations contributing to surplus (non)meanings 
approaching nonsense. The repetition of phonemes, sounds, or words characteristic of stammering or stuttering 
hold various implications ranging from the subconscious, unintentional to the strategic, artistic-ritualistic – all 
contributing the the generation of nonsense. Among children it can be decoded as emotionally charged baby-talk 
signalling infantile affection and care (for the infantile) – explaining Carroll’s ease among child-friends. It can 
also be the foundation of language games based on simple linguistic t(r)icks showing how a long enough 
repetition of any word may result either in the utter loss of meaning or the acquisition of truth value. In 
echolaliac repetitions it might just as well trouble social interaction by merely mirroring others’ phrases instead 
of answering them. It can potentially be accompanied by a ‘good vibration’ plugging us back to prediscursive 
primary drives’ corporeal joys that is heralded by psychoanalytically inspired languages philosophies, and that 
might originate in early-language-user’s speech acts being fuelled by the pleasurable repetitive compulsion, as in 
 
30 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 224. 
31 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 156. 
32 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 96. 
33 Carroll, Annotated Alice, p. 97. 
34 Jackie Wullschlager, “Lewis Carroll: The Child as Muse,” in Inventing Wonderland: The Lives and Fantasies of Lewis 
Carroll, Edward Lear, J.M. Barrie, Kenneth Grahame, and A.A. Milne (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 29-65. 
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the infantile crib-talk – a pre-sleep monologue made by young children in bed – proto-narratives preceding and 
subverting the conventionally linear narrative logic. In fantastic realms, it can occur in magical incantations’ 
spells, enchantments of mantras, which besides designating and signifying act, bring into being, they are. (In 
Wonderland when a baby is repeatedly called a pig, he becomes one, whereas the name Alice implies Alice-
hood.) Finally, it also characterises sleeptalking’s discursive sidetracks, the somniloquist’s unconscious speech 
acts, whose very unintentionality turns them nonsensical, regardless of their contents. 
Somniloquy, talking while being asleep gains a vital significance in Alice on various grounds. Carroll on 
inventing tales for child-friends liked to pretend to fall asleep to mock his audience who then duly begged him to 
continue his improvised stories recalling dream-like fantasies. His fiction springs from his theory of the mind 
that differentiates between varying degrees of altered states of consciousness: the “ordinary,” and “eerie” states 
are followed by the “trance-like,” whereby one unconscious of actuality, apparently asleep, can migrate to 
fairyland.35 As the epigraph says, the wandering Alice moving phantom-wise under skies can be never seen by 
waking eyes.36  
Alice’s adventures share dreams’ surrealist illogic, grotesque figures, cadaver exquise-like random narrative 
structure, textual rules following chess and card games doomed to be transgressed. As Fiona MacArthur 
suggests, the simulation of a dream allows Carroll to free syntactically frozen linguistic strings from their typical 
collocational positions, and by disclosing the “mismatch between the child’s solutions to linguistic puzzles and 
their everyday use in communication” to consider their role in a dynamic problem solving activity, whereby 
learning (responding to incoming stimulus and relating to already held knowledge) occurs while dreaming.37  
Even more excitingly, the amateur Victorian photographer Carroll’s favourite genre that earned him a dubious 
reputation posthumously was the still-life-like nude of the sleeping child. Way beyond the paedophiliac intents 
attributed to Carroll’s gaze by post-Freudian misreadings, the photographic topic of the naked child asleep 
functions as tableau vivant transmitting symbolical meanings to guarantee the spiritual elevation of the 
spectators. Moreover, according to Lindsay Smith, it might have possibly been an attempt to envelop the 
hesitancy of speech by representing children’s disembodied flesh as still, voiceless and miniaturized, and 
visually reaching a perfection it can never acquire verbally on accounts of being a wonderfully inhibited 
speaking subject.38  
In Carroll, speech impediments have clearly nonsense-generating potentials. Articulate, comprehensible, clear 
speech regarded to be a prerequisite and guarantee of rational, reliable and respectable personhood is 
consistently missing from all the fictional self-portraits the stammering Carroll draws of himself in Alice’s 
picturesque stories. The Dodo bird in the Caucus race evokes his own name Charles Lutwidge Dodgson mis-
pronounced as Do-Do-Dodgson. As an icon of extinction (species disappeared during recorded history due to 
human mistreatment), fossilized in phrases as “dead as a dodo,” “to go the dodo’s way” (become obsolete, dead) 
and gaining a mythical, fictionalized, unreal status (people cease to believe it has ever existed), the dodo bird can 
be associated with stammer, silence, linguistic forgeries, babble, and the questioning of one’s own reality-status 
along with ‘normal’ speech capacities. 
The fictional Alice in Wonderland recalls the mathematician Oxford dean Dodgson writing children’s fantasies 
under the penname Carroll on accounts of her loving to pretend in her plays that she is two persons. Sometimes 
she even goes as far as to adopt the very stammering discursive style of the author. Her telling stumbling on first 
person personal pronouns – “’Well! What are you?’ said the Pigeon. ‘I can see you’re trying to invent 
something!’ ‘I – I’m a little girl,’ said Alice, rather doubtfully, as she remembered the number of changes she 
had gone through that day.”39 – reveals a destabilisation of the self circumscribed as fundamentally ambiguous, 
heterogeneous and uncertain. The speaking subject dislocated by the spoken subject, the self overwhelmed and 
fractured by the voice and polyphonic, ventriloquist play with multiple fictional/authorial personalities 
(Dodgson-Carroll-Dodo-Alice), just like the sound engulfing the sense typically in fantasies’ nonsensical 
interactions all outline an ‘epistemology of uncertainty’. Here unknowing, doubt and an awareness of 
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alternatives (alternative possibilities and realities) is a significant constituent of knowledge. Madness makes part 
of reason, getting lost might be ground of getting somewhere, and meaning formation relies on, or is inspired by 
both the acoustic (voiced) and the logocentric (written/read), both the affective, the corporeal and the cognitive, 
logical aspects and non-sensations sensation alike.  
Perhaps the most enchanting fictional self-portrait of Carroll is the Knight, the melancholic inventor of 
nonsensical gadgets (like the bag worn upside down to keep out the rain, or the shark trap adjusted onto a 
horseback), a bizarre fantasy-creature loitering in wonderland, who struggles to keep his balance on his horse, 
yet lets go the bridle, and falls to break his bones again and again, stretching his arms towards Alice who 
repeatedly helps him to gather himself together. The Knight is also a reminder of the very materiality of the 
signifier, the transverbal musicality of language and the impossibility of nonsense’s meaninglessness on 
accounts of the author’s favourite letter B invading his very being. A rhetorically-concerned, deconstructive 
interpretation’s microscopic focus might lead to far-sighted conclusions. I believe that all the words starting with 
“b”-s in the Knight-passage describing “the great art of riding” homophonous with “the great art of writing” – as 
in “beginnings,” “bones broken,” “balance (un)kept,” “bridle” meant to control and let loose, “both arms” unable 
to hold on, falling “backwards,” lieing on his “back” vulnerable, helpless, dreaming – are poetically telling of the 
author’s alexythmiac yet hypersensitive personality; his very being risked and rescued by Alice, who equally 
denotes the real-life muse, the fictionalized character, and the reader willing to get lost in the text; all Alices, 
who gain the status of a nonsensical object of desire as subject of identification and source of textuality (as de/re-
generators of meanings). The proliferation of “b”-s simultaneously defamiliarises sense by laying stress on 
sound, and stages a nonsensical venture doomed to gain metatextual signification by marvellously foregrounding 
our ‘be-ing’ held and released in a language. This is a language that ‘normally’ summons and suppresses 
senselessness, attempts to compensate for the loss of the Real in vain, and proves to be a rule-bound system that 
nevertheless allows for a ‘free fall,’ provided we are willing to activate our cooperative readerly imaginative 
faculties and embodied experiences of meaning-formation, so as to enliven the word into a wonderworld of 
magic.40  
Carroll’s relation to oral and written representative practices must have been more complicated due to his 
limited and twisted language-use (his stuttering utterances and language-game-based texts) and a vulnerable 
personality posthumously diagnosed as a likely case of a high functioning autism spectrum disorder called 
Asperger’s syndrome. Symptoms fitting the Carrollian myth include social ineptitude, lack of commonsense and 
empathy, (difficulties with interaction, communication, imagination, emotional ties), fragmentary-analytical 
thinking, intense obsessive interest in a specific subject and related restricted repetitive, stereotyped activities 
and patterns of behaviour, a resistance to change. However, the most important feature is an especially intimate, 
peculiar relation to language, that might range from highly sophisticated language skills, linguistic inventiveness 
(creation of an incomprehensible language of one’s own), to difficulties with enacting and interpreting linguistic 
abstractions and non-verbal sign-language (gestures, facial expression, clumsiness), or obsession with  difficult 
words and expressions.41 
Perhaps there is no need for psychopathologisation, and it is in the name of neurodiversity that we should 
explore the plethora of different, alternative means of making sense and sound. Understanding the psychic-
cognitive-physical processes throughout the production and reception of nonsense might help us in 
understanding those unprecedented contemporary discursive practices which cannot be schematised by 
conventional communicational models (of the sender-message-receiver triangular structure-type). Online internet 
telecommunication practices, like the 140 characters-long, SMS-like microblogging self-expressions on Twitter, 
or Facebook updates on insignificant daily phenomena narrating what is happening or what is on one’s mind at 
the given fleeting moment are shared with everyone, addressed to no one in particular, and without excepting 
any particular response or feedback. They uncannily resemble ‘mutterances’ of talking to oneself under one’s 
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breath, deviant speech acts, which do nothing in particular despite being uttered, and by failing to fulfil the 
criteria of a message, approach nonsensical claims. The very name of twit is “meant to capture the physical 
sensation that you’re buzzing your friend’s pocket,” like a “chirp from birds” it signifies “a short burst of 
inconsequential information:” physical, sensorial, nearly-instinctive, inconsequential, it definitely challenges our 
commonsense concept of communication. A research has found out that besides news, spam, self-promotion, 
conversation, and pass-along value, “pointless babble” accounts for most of Twitter’s content (40.55 percent of 
the total number of messages).42 Whether these online ‘mutterances’ reflect the infantile need to express and 
reinforce our being through words and letters, or constitute artistic actions gratuites with l’art pour l’art 
motivations replacing utilitarian purposes, whether they are postmodernist deconstructive attempts at (un)making 
meanings, inspirational daily brainstorms, or trace brand new form of social networkings, these cyberspatial 
verbal-errings’ (mal)function seems to adapt a wonderlandish (il)logic. Following the Cheshire Cat’s advice, “it 
doesn’t matter which way you go,” you are sure “to get somewhere,” “if you only walk long enough,”43 in other 
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